We investigate the trade-o¤s between price stability and the sustainability of sovereign debt, using a small open economy model where the government issues nominal defaultable debt and chooses …scal and monetary policy under discretion. In ‡ation reduces the real value of outstanding debt, thus making it more sustainable; but it also raises nominal yields and entails direct welfare costs. We compare this scenario with a situation in which the government gives up the ability to de ‡ate debt away, e.g. by issuing foreign currency debt or joining a monetary union with an anti-in ‡ationary stance. We …nd that the bene…ts of giving up such adjustment margin dominate its costs, both for our preferred calibration and for a wide range of parameter values.
Introduction
One of the main legacies of the 2007-9 …nancial crisis and the subsequent recession has been the emergence of large …scal de…cits across the industrialized world. The consequence has been a sharp increase in government debt, with debt-to-GDP ratios near or above record levels in countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Japan or the Euro area periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain). Before the summer of 2012, Euro area periphery economies experienced dramatic spikes in their sovereign yields, whereas other highly indebted countries did not. Many observers emphasized that a key di¤erence between both groups of countries was that, whereas the US, UK and Japan had the option to de ‡ate away the real burden of nominal debt though in ‡ation, the Euro countries were forced to repay debt solely through …scal surpluses. At the same time, the experience of a number of developing countries such as Mexico or Brazil, in which sovereign debt is often issued directly in foreign currency, illustrates situations in which governments sometimes renounce the possibility of de ‡ating away their debts.
These developments raise the question as to what role monetary policy should have, if any, in guaranteeing the sustainability of sovereign debt, in view of the existing trade-o¤s between the latter and price stability. Broadly speaking, on the one hand it can be argued that central banks should provide a 'monetary backstop' that reassures investors in sovereign debt. 1 On the other hand, such a course of action may presumably give rise to in ‡ation, with the resulting costs and distortions. Moreover, while using in ‡ation temporarily for debt-de ‡ation purposes may not largely a¤ect in ‡ation expectations in countries (such as the US or UK) where monetary authorities are perceived to have a clear and credible commitment towards price stability, the same may not be true in countries with a poorer in ‡ation record and/or weaker monetary credibility, thus limiting the e¤ectiveness of debt de ‡ation policies. In this paper, we try to shed light on the above issues by studying the trade-o¤s between price stability and sovereign debt sustainability when the government cannot make credible commitments about in ‡ation. With this purpose, we build a general equilibrium, continuous-time model of a small open economy in which a benevolent government issues long-term sovereign nominal bonds to foreign investors. At any time, the government may default on its debt if it …nds it optimal to do so. Default produces some costs due to temporary exclusion from capital markets and a drop in the output endowment. We show that the default decision is characterized by an optimal default threshold for the model's single state variable, the debt-to-GDP ratio. In addition, the government chooses …scal and monetary policy optimally under discretion. That is, the government cannot commit to a future path for primary de…cit and in ‡ation. When choosing in ‡ation, the government trades o¤ bene…ts and costs. On the one hand, in ‡ation reduces the real value of debt; ceteris paribus, this improves sovereign debt sustainability by making default a less likely outcome. On the other hand, in ‡ation entails a direct welfare cost. Moreover, expectations of future in ‡ation worsen such trade-o¤ by raising nominal yields for new bond issuances, thus making primary de…cits more costly to …nance. We calibrate our model to capture some salient features of the EMU periphery economies, including their observed in ‡ation record prior to joining the euro. Under our baseline calibration, the optimal in ‡ation policy function increases roughly linearly with the debt ratio, and then increases steeply as the latter approaches the optimal default threshold. Importantly, the government allows for relatively high in ‡ation rates at debt ratios for which default is still perceived as rather distant by investors. We refer to this baseline scenario as the 'in ‡ationary regime'.
We then compare the baseline in ‡ationary regime with a scenario in which in ‡ation is zero at all times. In other words, the government e¤ectively renounces the possibility of de ‡ating debt away. Given our assumption that the government cannot make credible in ‡ation commitments, this 'no in ‡ation'regime is best interpreted as a situation in which the government directly issues foreign currency debt, or in which it joins a monetary union with a very strong and credible antiin ‡ationary stance. We …nd that welfare in the no-in ‡ation regime is higher at any debt ratio. The reason is that the no-in ‡ation regime avoids the costs of in ‡ation (in terms of higher yields and direct welfare costs) while not compromising too much the sustainability of sovereign debt. Indeed, while renouncing the option to de ‡ate debt away does make debt more vulnerable by making default more likely, such an event is still perceived as rather distant by investors at all debt ratios except for those very close to default. We also …nd that optimal default thresholds are nearly identical in both regimes, and that welfare under no-in ‡ation is higher too at such threshold. 2 Having characterized equilibrium in both regimes at each point of the state space, we then compute the stationary distribution of the main variables so as to analyze the average performance of both regimes. We …nd that the in ‡ationary regime shifts the distribution of the debt ratio to the left vis-à-vis the no-in ‡ation one. This improves sovereign debt sustainability, lowering average sovereign risk premia. However, this e¤ect is dominated by higher average in ‡ation premia, the net e¤ect being higher average bond yields. Moreover, the presence of trend in ‡ation creates direct welfare costs. As a consequence, the in ‡ationary regime produces a loss in average welfare relative to the no-in ‡ation scenario, one that is of …rst-order magnitude in our baseline calibration. We show that our …ndings are robust to alternative calibrations of parameters that determine bond maturity, bond recovery rates and output losses upon default.
Finally, as an alternative to giving up the debt de ‡ation margin altogether, we investigate an intermediate arrangement in which the government delegates monetary policy to an independent central banker with a greater distaste for in ‡ation than society as a whole. We …nd that delegating monetary policy to such a 'conservative'central banker allows to achieve superior welfare outcomes vis-à-vis the baseline in ‡ationary regime, in which the benevolent government chooses in ‡ation discretionarily. As it turns out, however, average welfare never reaches that of the 'no in ‡ation' regime: it increases monotonically with the central banker's distaste for in ‡ation, converging asymptotically to its level under the latter regime. Taken together, our results o¤er an important quali…cation of the conventional wisdom that individual countries may bene…t from retaining the option to de ‡ate away their sovereign debt. In particular, our analysis suggests that such countries may actually be better o¤ by renouncing such a tool if their governments are unable to make credible commitments about their future in ‡ation policy. This quali…cation may be relevant for most EMU peripheral economies, in view of their in ‡ation record (relative e.g. to that of Germany) in the decades prior to joining the euro. Our …ndings may also rationalize why a number of developing countries with limited in ‡ation credibility typically resort to issuing debt in terms of a hard foreign currency. . These papers consider self-ful…lling debt crises along the lines of Calvo (1988) or Cole and Kehoe (2000) . We complement this literature by considering a framework in which sovereign default is instead an optimal government decision based on fundamentals, in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) .
3 Also, the above contributions are qualitative, working in environments with two periods or two-period-lived agents (Corsetti and Dedola, 2014; Camous and Cooper, 2014) or without fundamental uncertainty (Aguiar et al., 2013) . 4 By contrast, we adopt a fully dynamic, stochastic approach, which makes our model potentially useful for quantitative analysis. In particular, we show that our model can replicate well average sovereign yields and risk premia in the peripheral EMU economies, while also matching average external sovereign debt stocks. We also show that our model can rationalize the reduction in sovereign bond yields across EMU periphery countries relative to the pre-EMU period, which suggests that investors perceived the reduction in in ‡ation expectations as more important than the presumable increase in default risk. Our modeling of in ‡ation disutility costs is based on Aguiar et al. (2013) , who interpret the 3 In Corsetti and Dedola (2014) default crisis can also be due to weak fundamentals. 4 Da Rocha et al. (2013) and Araujo et al. (2013) analyze the connection between in ‡ation and the possibility of self-ful…lling debt crisis in fully dynamic, stochastic frameworks. Da Rocha et al. (2013) analyze optimal debt and exchange rate policy in a model with foreign currency debt where the government is exposed to both self-ful…lling defaults and devaluations. Araujo et al. (2013) consider the welfare gains or losses from issuing debt in local versus foreign currency, in a framework where the costs of local currency debt are due to an exogenous in ‡ation shock. weight on such disutility as the government's 'in ‡ation credibility'. 5 These authors …nd that, under certain conditions (such as a moderate in ‡ation credibility and intermediate debt levels), issuing domestic currency debt may achieve superior welfare outcomes relative to issuing foreign currency debt. In our framework with fundamental default à la Eaton-Gersovitz, by contrast, giving up the option to de ‡ate debt away (e.g. by issuing foreign currency debt) consistently outperforms issuing domestic currency debt and de ‡ating it at discretion, regardless of the degree of in ‡ation credibility.
In modeling optimal default à la Eaton-Gersovitz in a quantitative framework, our model is more in line with the literature on quantitative sovereign default models initiated by Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008) . 6 We build on this literature by introducing nominal bonds and studying the optimal in ‡ation policy when the government cannot commit not to in ‡ate in the future. This allows us to address the trade-o¤s between price stability and sovereign debt vulnerability in a uni…ed framework. Another di¤erence with respect to the quantitative sovereign default literature is our reliance on continuous time. Continuous-time methods are standard in the corporate default literature initiated by Merton (1974) and Leland (1994) due to their tractability. 7 We show how one can extend this analysis to the pricing of defaultable nominal sovereign debt.
In studying the e¤ects of delegating monetary policy to an independent, conservative central banker, our analysis revisits an old theme initiated by Rogo¤ (1985) and further discussed e.g. in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), although it does so in a very di¤erent context. 8 In particular, we explore the e¤ects of delegation in a framework in which the bene…t of allowing for in ‡ation is not to exploit a short-run output/in ‡ation trade-o¤, as in the mainstream New Keynesian literature, but rather to make sovereign debt more sustainable. Contrary to the linear(ized) frameworks typically used in the New Keynesian literature, our framework takes full account of the strong non-linearities that emerge in the presence of equilibrium sovereign default. As in that literature, we …nd that there are welfare gains from delegating discretionary monetary policy to an independent authority with a greater distaste for in ‡ation than that of society. What is perhaps more striking is that, whereas the optimal 'delegated' in ‡ation distaste in the above literature is relatively large but …nite, in our framework welfare is maximized when such distaste is arbitrarily large, i.e. when the government completely abandons the option of adjusting in ‡ation. 5 In an environment similar to Aguiar et al. (2013) , Aguiar et al. (2015) study the impact of the composition of debt in a monetary union on the occurrence of self-ful…lling debt crises. One important di¤erence between Aguiar et al. (2013 Aguiar et al. ( , 2015 and our paper is that we consider quadratic (as opposed to linear) in ‡ation costs, which allows us to obtain interior solutions for optimal in ‡ation. 6 Other notable contributions to this literature include Benjamin Finally, we make a technical contribution by introducing a new numerical method to …nd the equilibrium in continuous-time models with several agents. In particular we extend the recent literature about …nite di¤erence methods applied to stochastic control in economics, such as Achdou et al. (2014) or Nuño and Moll (2014) , to analyze a recursive optimal stopping problem in which one of the agents employs both continuously chosen controls and discrete adjustments of the state variables. Optimal stopping problems are typically solved using optimal splitting methods, as in Barles, Daher and Romano (1995) . However, the recursivity of our problem and the fact that it only has one state variable makes our method better suited to this particular problem.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we introduce the model. Section 3 provides the main results. Section 4 introduces monetary policy delegation. Section 5 concludes.
Model
We consider a continuous-time model of a small open economy.
Output, price level and sovereign debt
Let ( ; F; fF t g ; P) be a …ltered probability space. There is a single, freely-traded consumption good which has an international price normalized to one. The economy is endowed with Y t units of the good each period (real GDP). The evolution of Y t is given by
where W t is a F t -Brownian motion, 2 R is the drift parameter and 2 R + is the volatility. The local currency price relative to the World price at time t is denoted P t : It evolves according to
where t is the instantaneous in ‡ation rate. The government trades a nominal non-contingent bond with risk-neutral competitive foreign investors. Let B t denote the outstanding stock of nominal government bonds; assuming that each bond has a nominal value of one unit of domestic currency, B t also represents the total nominal value of outstanding debt. We assume that outstanding debt is amortized at rate > 0 per unit of time. The nominal value of outstanding debt thus evolves as follows,
where B new t is the ‡ow of new debt issued at time t. The nominal market price of government bonds at time t is Q t . Each bond pays a proportional coupon per unit of time. Also, the government incurs a nominal primary de…cit P t (C t Y t ), where C t is aggregate consumption. 9 The government's ‡ow of funds constraint is then
That is, the proceeds from issuance of new bonds must cover amortization and coupon payments plus the primary de…cit. Combining the last two equations, we obtain the following dynamics for nominal debt outstanding,
We de…ne the debt-to-GDP ratio as b t B t = (P t Y t ). Its dynamics are obtained by applying Itô's lemma to equations (1)- (3),
where c t (C t Y t ) =Y t is the primary de…cit-to-GDP ratio. Equation (4) describes the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio as a function of the primary de…cit ratio, in ‡ation and the bond price.
In particular, ceteris paribus in ‡ation t allows to reduce the debt ratio by reducing the real value of nominal debt. We also impose a non-negativity constraint on debt: b t 0.
Preferences
The representative household has preferences over paths for consumption and domestic in ‡ation given by
We assume that instantaneous utility takes the form
where > 0. We follow Aguiar et al. (2013) in posing a reduced-form speci…cation for the welfare costs of in ‡ation, ( =2) functional form, which allows us to obtain interior solutions for optimal in ‡ation. 10 Using C t =
(1 + c t ) Y t , we can express welfare in terms of the primary de…cit ratio c t as follows,
where
is the (exogenous) value at time t = 0 of being in autarky forever. 11 Thus, welfare increases with the primary de…cit ratio c t , as this allows households to consume more for a given exogenous output; and it decreases with squared in ‡ation deviations from zero.
Fiscal and monetary policy
The government chooses …scal policy at each point in time along two dimensions: it sets optimally the primary surplus ratio c t , and it chooses whether to continue honoring debt repayments or else to default. In addition, the government implements monetary policy by choosing the in ‡ation rate t at each point in time. We now present the sovereign default scenario, which a¤ects the boundary conditions of the general optimization problem.
The default scenario
In case of default, the government su¤ers a double punishment. First, it is excluded from international capital markets temporarily. The duration of this exclusion period, , is random and follows an exponential distribution with average duration 1= : Second, during the exclusion period the country's output endowment declines. Suppose the government defaults at an arbitrary debt ratio b. Then during the exclusion period the country's output endowment is given by
with ;b > 0, such that the loss in (log)output equals maxf0; b b g. Therefore, the country su¤ers an output loss only if it defaults at a debt ratio higher than a thresholdb. This speci…cation of output loss is similar to the one in Arellano (2008) and, as in that paper, it helps the model achieve realistic default probabilities and risk premia. 10 Aguiar et al. (2013) adopt instead a linear in ‡ation disutility, and restrict in ‡ation to be within a closed interval. As explained by the authors, this gives rise to bang-bang in ‡ation equilibria. 11 Notice that (1) and Itô's Lemma imply d log Y t = 2 =2 dt + dW t . Solving for log Y t and taking time 0 conditional expectations yields E 0 (log Y t ) = log Y 0 + 2 =2 t, which combined with the de…nition of V aut 0 gives us the right-hand side of (8) . 12 In Arellano (2008), the output loss following default equals Y t Y def t = maxf0; Y t Ŷ g, for some threshold output levelŶ . Specifying our output loss function in terms of b t (as opposed to Y t ) allows us to retain the During the exclusion phase, households simply consume the output endowment, C t = Y def t , which implies
The main advantage of defaulting is of course the possibility of reducing the debt burden. During the exclusion period, which we may interpret as a renegotiation process between the government and the investors, the latter receive no repayments. We assume that at the end of the exclusion period (with random duration ) both parties reach an agreement by which investors recover only a fraction Yt + Pt + = (YtPt) of the nominal value of outstanding bonds at the time of default (where the latter is denoted byt), for some parameter > 0. 13 This speci…cation captures in reduced form the idea that the terms of the debt restructuring agreement are somehow sensitive to the country's macroeconomic performance. 14 Importantly, it allows us to keep the set of state variables restricted to the debt ratio only. To see this, notice that upon regaining access to capital markets, the debt ratio is
where bt = Bt=YtPt is the debt ratio at the time of default. Therefore, the government reenters capital markets with a debt ratio that is a fraction of the ratio at which it defaulted. It follows that the government has no incentive to create in ‡ation during the exclusion period, as that would generate direct welfare costs while not reducing the debt ratio upon reentry; we thus have t = 0 for t 2 (t;t + ). Taking all these elements together, we can express the value of defaulting att = 0 as
is the autarky value as de…ned in (8), and V def 0 V def (b 0 ) is the value of defaulting net of the autarky value, given by
where in the second equality we use our assumption that is exponentially distributed, and where V ( ) is the value function of the government, to be de…ned later. For future reference, the slope convenient model feature that b t is the only relevant state variable. 13 Notice that Yt and Yt + represent, respectively, the output levels exactly at the time the government decides to default (i.e. right before output drops) and exactly upon regaining access to capital markets ( i.e. right after output recovers again). Therefore, they do not incorporate the output loss during exclusion.
14 See Benjamin and Wright (2009) and Yue (2010) for studies that endogenize the recovery rate upon default, in models with explicit renegotiation betwen the government and its creditors.
of the default value function is
where 1( ) is the indicator function.
The general problem
As mentioned before, at every point in time the government decides optimally whether to default or not, in addition to choosing the primary de…cit ratio and the in ‡ation rate. Following a default, and once the government regains access to capital markets, it starts accumulating debt and is confronted again with the choice of defaulting. This is a sequence of recursive optimal stopping problems, as one of the policy instruments is a sequence of stopping times. The solution to this problem will be characterized by an optimal default threshold for the debt ratio, which we denote by b . This threshold de…nes an "inaction region"of the state space, [0; b ), in which the government chooses not to default, and a region [b ; 1) in which the government defaults. We denote by T (b ) the time to default. The latter is a stopping time with respect to the …ltration fF t g, de…ned as the smallest time t 0 such that
The government maximizes social welfare (i.e. it behaves benevolently) under discretion. The value function of the government (net of the exogenous autarky value) at time t = 0 can then be expressed as
subject to the law of motion of the debt ratio, equation (4) . The optimal default threshold b must satisfy the following two conditions,
where V def (b ) and V 0 def (b ) are given respectively by equations (9) and (10) evaluated at b = b . Equation (12) is the value matching condition and it requires that, at the default threshold, the value of honoring debt repayments equals the value of defaulting. Equation (13) is the smooth pasting condition, and it requires that there is no kink at the optimal default threshold. 16 Both are standard conditions in optimal stopping problems; see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , Oksendal and Sulem (2007) and Stokey (2009) . These conditions imply that the value function is continuous and continuously di¤erentiable:
The solution of this problem must satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, (12) and (13) . 18 The term in squared brackets
in (14) is the drift of the state variable (see equation 4). The optimal primary de…cit ratio and in ‡ation rate are given by the following …rst order conditions,
Therefore, the optimal primary de…cit ratio increases with bond prices and decreases with the slope of the value function (in absolute value). The intuition is straightforward. Higher bond prices (equivalently, lower bond yields) make it cheaper for the government to …nance primary de…cits. Likewise, a steeper value function makes it more costly to increase the debt burden by incurring primary de…cits. As regards optimal in ‡ation, the latter increases both with the debt ratio and the slope (in absolute value) of the value function. Intuitively, the higher the debt ratio the larger the reduction in the debt burden that can be achieved through a marginal increase in in ‡ation. Similarly, a steeper value function increases the incentive to use in ‡ation so as to reduce the debt burden.
The ' no in ‡ation'regime
So far we have analyzed the decision problem of a benevolent government that cannot make credible commitments about its future …scal policy (including the possibility of defaulting) and monetary policy. In particular, the inability to commit not to use in ‡ation in the future so as to de ‡ate debt away implies that the government is unable to steer investor's in ‡ation expectations in a way that favors welfare outcomes. While lacking commitment, however, we can think of situations in which the government e¤ectively relinquishes the ability to de ‡ate debt away. Formally, we may consider a monetary regime in which in ‡ation is zero in all states: (b) = 0, for all b. The government's problem is given by (14) with = 0 replacing the optimal in ‡ation choice, and with boundary conditions given again by (12) and (13) .
We may interpret such a 'no in ‡ation' scenario in alternative ways. One can …rst think of a situation in which the government appoints an independent central banker with a strong, in fact arbitrarily great, distaste for in ‡ation. Even under discretion, such a central banker would always choose = 0. One problem with this interpretation, though, is that it is unlikely that a government that cannot make credible commitments about monetary policy would appoint a central banker with such extreme preferences towards in ‡ation. 19 A second, perhaps more plausible interpretation is that the government directly issues bonds denominated in foreign currency. In that case, the possibility of de ‡ating debt away simply disappears, and with it the only bene…t of in ‡ating in this model. As a result, optimal in ‡ation is always zero in such a scenario.
Finally, we may think of a situation in which the government joins a monetary union in which the common monetary authority has an extreme distaste for in ‡ation. If the costs of exiting the monetary union are very high, then joining it signals a credible anti-in ‡ationary commitment.
In what follows, we will simply refer to this scenario as the 'no in ‡ation regime', keeping in mind that such scenario admits several interpretations along the lines just discussed.
Foreign investors
When choosing …scal and monetary policy, the government takes as given the mapping between the debt ratio and the nominal price of bonds, Q(b). We now characterize such bond price function. The government sells bonds to competitive risk-neutral foreign investors that can invest elsewhere at the risk-free real rate r. As explained before, bonds pay a coupon rate and are amortized at rate . Following a default, and during the exclusion period of the government, investors receive no payments. Once the exclusion/renegotiation period ends, investors recover a fraction
of the nominal value of each bond, where we have used the fact that optimal in ‡ation is zero during the exclusion period, such that Pt + = Pt. 20 They also anticipate that the government's debt ratio at the time of reentering …nancial markets will be b , such that their outstanding bonds will carry a market price Q ( b ). Therefore, the nominal price of the bond at 19 In section 4 we will consider a more general scenario in which the government appoints a conservative central banker whose distaste for in ‡ation is greater than that of society, but not so extreme as to imply zero in ‡ation at all times. 20 The average recovery rate equals
), where we have used E Yt + =Yt j = exp( ) and the fact that is exponentially distributed.
time t = 0 for a current debt ratio b b is given by
where again T (b ) denotes the smallest time to default. 21 Applying the Feynman-Kac formula, we obtain the following recursive representation,
for all b 2 [0; b ). To determine the boundary condition for Q(b), we calculate the expected value of outstanding bonds at the time of default (T (b ) = 0),
where in the third equality we have used
The partial di¤erential equation (18), together with the boundary condition (19) , provide the risk-neutral pricing of the nominal defaultable sovereign bond. 22 
Some de…nitions
Given a current bond price Q (b), the implicit bond yield r (b) is the discount rate for which the discounted future promised cash ‡ows from the bond equal its price. The discounted future promised payments are
. Therefore, the bond yield function is
The gap between the yield r (b) and the riskless real rate r re ‡ects both (a) the risk of sovereign default, i.e. a risk premium, and (b) the anticipation of in ‡ation during the life of the bond, i.e. an in ‡ation premium. In order to disentangle both factors, we de…ne the riskless yield as
, whereQ (b) is the price that the investor would pay for a riskless nominal bond with the same promised cash ‡ows as the risky nominal bond. Appendix B de…nesQ (b) and 21 Notice that the recovery payo¤
no principal is repaid during the exclusion period (of length ). 22 Again, there also exists the state constraint b 0.
explains how to solve for it. We then decompose
where r (b) r (b) is the risk premium, andr (b) r is the in ‡ation premium. In the no in ‡ation regime, the riskless rate is simplyr (b) = r, the in ‡ation premium is zero, and the risk premium is r (b) r. Finally, we de…ne the expected time to default, given a current debt ratio b, as
Appendix C shows how to compute T e (b) numerically.
Equilibrium
We de…ne our equilibrium concept:
; a value function V : ! R; a pair of policy functions c; : ! R and a bond price function Q : ! R + such that 1. Given prices Q, for any initial debt b 0 2 the value function V solves the government problem (14) , with boundary conditions ( 12) and ( 13); the optimal in ‡ation is , the optimal de…cit ratio is c, and the optimal debt threshold is b :
2. Given the optimal in ‡ation , de…cit ratio c and the interval ; bond prices satisfy the pricing equation (18) .
The government takes the bond price as given and chooses in ‡ation and de…cit (continuous policies) and default (stopping policy) to maximize its value function. The investors take these policies as given and price government bonds accordingly.
Quantitative analysis
Having laid out our theoretical model, we now use it in order to analyze the trade-o¤ between price stability and the sustainability of sovereign debt. We are not able to …nd an analytical solution to our model. Therefore we resort to numerical techniques. We next describe our solution algorithm.
Computational algorithm
Here we propose a computational algorithm aimed at …nding the equilibrium. The structure of the model complicates its solution as it comprises a pair of coupled ordinary di¤erence equations (ODEs): the HJB equation (14) and the bond pricing equation (18) . The policies obtained from the HJB are necessary to compute the bond prices and simultaneously, bond prices are necessary to compute the drift in the HJB equation.
In order to solve the HJB and bond pricing equations, we employ an upwind …nite di¤erence method. 23 24 We use the notation V is the iteration counter, and analogously for Q (n)
i : In order to compute the numerical solution to the recursive competitive equilibrium we proceed in three steps. We consider an initial guess of the bond price function,
, and the default threshold, b (0) : Set n = 1: Then:
Step 1: Government problem. Given Q (n 1) and b (n 1) ; we solve the optimal stopping problem with variable controls. This means solving the HJB equation (14) in the domain [0; b (n 1) ] imposing the smooth pasting condition (13) (but not the value matching condition) to obtain an estimate of the value function V
and of primary de…cit and in ‡ation,
Step 2: Investors problem. Given c (n) , (n) and b (n 1) , solve the bond pricing equation (18) and obtain Q (n) in the domain [0; b (n 1) ]: Then iterate again on steps 1 and 2 until both the value and bond price functions converge for given b (n 1) .
Step 3: Optimal boundary. Given V (n) from step 2, we check whether the value matching condition (12) is satis…ed. We compute
def (b (n 1) ), then decrease the threshold. Set n := n + 1. Proceed again to steps 1 and 2 until the value matching condition V (b ) = V def (b ) is satis…ed.
Appendix A provides further details on these steps. The idea of the algorithm is to …nd the equilibrium numerically by moving the default threshold b and solving the HJB and bond pricing equations. The algorithm stops when the value matching condition (12) is satis…ed. 23 Barles and Souganidis (1991) have proved how this method converges to the unique viscosity solution of the problem. The latter is the appropriate concept of a general solution for stochastic optimal control problems (Crandall and Lions, 1983; Crandall, Ishii and Lions, 1992) . 24 We thus have b = b =I. We use I = 800 grid points in all our simulations.
Calibration
Let the unit of time by 1 year, such that all rates are in annual terms. Most papers in the literature on quantitative optimal sovereign default models set the world riskless real interest rate and the subjective discount rate to 1% and 5% per quarter, respectively. 25 We thus set r = 0:04 and = 0:20 per year. In order to calibrate the drift and volatility of the exogenous output process, we use annual GDP growth data for the EMU periphery countries (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) over the period 1995-2012. 26 Averaging the mean and standard deviation of GDP growth across these countries, we obtain = 0:022 and = 0:032. The bond amortization rate is such that the average Macaulay bond duration, 1= ( + r), is 5 years, which is broadly consistent with international evidence on bond duration (see e.g. Cruces et al. 2002) . We set the coupon rate equal to r, such that the price of a riskless real bond, ( + ) = ( r + ), is normalized to 1.
We set such that the average duration of the exclusion period is 1= = 3 years, consistently with international evidence on exclusion periods in Dias and Richmond (2007) . The bond recovery rate parameter, , is set such that the mean recovery rate, = ( ), is 60%, consistent with the evidence in Benjamin and Wright (2009) and Cruces and Trebesch (2011).
The parameters determining the output loss during the exclusion period,b and ", are set in order for the model with zero in ‡ation to replicate (i) the average ratio of external public debt over GDP across EMU periphery economies in our sample period (35.6%) and (ii) an output decline of 6% following default. 27 Regarding the latter, the literature o¤ers a broad range of values, from 2% (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006) to 13-14% (Mendoza and Yue, 2012; Arellano, 2008) . The midpoint of this range would be 8%. We target a more conservative output loss of 6%. Finally, in order to calibrate the government's dislike for in ‡ation, , we we turn to the in ‡a-tionary model regime and target an average in ‡ation rate of 3.2%. The latter corresponds to the average CPI in ‡ation di¤erential between the EMU periphery economies and the US during the 25 The world interest rate is set to 1% per quarter in Aguiar 26 See Appendix E for data sources and treatment. 27 We use the no-in ‡ation scenario as the model counterpart of our sample region and period (the average EMU peripheral economy in euro period). First, as discussed in section 2.3.3, the no-in ‡ation regime can be interpreted as an (anti-in ‡ationary) monetary union. Second, as we explain below, we choose the US CPI as the empirical proxy for the 'World price' in the model, which is furthermore normalized to 1. We thus use CPI in ‡ation di¤erentials (rather than levels) relative to the US as the relevant empirical counterpart for in ‡ation in the model. As we show in section 3.4, the average in ‡ation di¤erential across EMU peripheral economies relative to the US was close to zero (0.4% annual) in our sample period, such that the no-in ‡ation regime provides a good approximation for observed in ‡ation di¤erentials in our sample. period 1987-1997. 28 We thus use observed in ‡ation di¤erentials in the years before the creation of EMU in order to back up the preferences for in ‡ation in such countries at a time when they were able to issue debt in their own currency. 
Equilibrium
The green dotted lines in Figure 1 show the equilibrium value function and policy functions in the 'in ‡ationary regime'. As shown by the upper left subplot, the value function declines gently with the country's debt burden. The optimal default threshold equals b = 37:0% and is marked by a green circle. At that point, the government defaults and, following the exclusion period, reenters capital markets with a debt ratio b = 20:7%.As regards nominal bond prices Q (b), the latter re ‡ect mainly expected in ‡ation during the life of the bond, except for debt ratios close to default. To see this more clearly, Figure 2 and the riskless real rate r is decomposed between the risk and in ‡ation premia, as de…ned in section 2.5. Indeed, except for debt ratios close to b , bond yields re ‡ect the risk of default only marginally, with risk premia in the range from 100 to 150 bp. The reason is that default is still perceived as a very distant outcome, as re ‡ected by an expected time to default around 40 years. However, as debt approaches the default threshold, investors start perceiving default as rather imminent, demanding higher and higher risk premia. This in turn increases the Regarding in ‡ation, the government's incentive to de ‡ate debt away increase approximately linearly with the debt ratio. This is because the value function is approximately linear, such that the welfare gain per unit of debt reduction is roughly constant. However, in the vicinity of the default threshold, the value function starts declining more and more steeply, such that a marginal reduction in the debt ratio yields a higher and higher marginal gain in welfare. As a result, optimal in ‡ation increases steeply until reaching about 12% at default. Therefore, under discretion, the optimal trade-o¤ between price stability and sovereign debt sustainability prescribes a roughly linear increase in in ‡ation for moderate debt levels, and a strong increase as the economy approaches default.
Consider now the equilibrium in the 'no-in ‡ation regime', depicted by the solid blue lines in Figure 1 . As explained in section 2.3.3, this scenario can be interpreted as issuing foreign currency debt or joining a monetary union with a very strong anti-in ‡ationary commitment. The …rst aspect to notice is that the optimal default threshold (b =0 = 37:2%; see blue circles) is essentially the same as in the baseline, in ‡ationary regime. 29 This does not mean however that sovereign debt is equally vulnerable. Indeed, for all debt ratios except those very close to default, expected time to default is lower (by around 8 years) when the government cannot use in ‡ation to de ‡ate debt away. However, because default is still perceived as rather distant (about 30 years in expectation), the upward pressure on nominal yields from higher default risk is easily outweighed by the disappearance of the in ‡ation premium (see also Figure 2 ). As a result, nominal yields are consistently lower in the no-in ‡ation regime. This makes it less costly for the government to incur primary de…cits, thus raising consumption for given exogenous output. In addition, the direct welfare cost of in ‡ation, ( =2) 2 , disappears in the 'no in ‡ation'regime. Thus, both e¤ects (lower nominal yields and no direct welfare costs) imply that the value function is higher in the no-in ‡ation regime. Notice …nally that the value function at the default threshold is also higher under no in ‡ation. To understand why, notice that in both regimes the value function at default equals
where we have used the fact that, under our calibration, b >b for both regimes. The fact that the default thresholds is very similar in both cases implies that so is the output loss from default, (b b ). It also implies that, after the exclusion period, the government reenters capital markets with essentially the same debt ratio ( b = 20:7%, versus b =0 = 20:8%). However, at such ratio the value function is higher in the no-in ‡ation regime, for the reasons just discussed.
To summarize the previous discussion, the no-in ‡ation regime achieves superior welfare outcomes at any debt ratio. It does so, …rst, by avoiding the temptation to in ‡ate at points of the state space where default is still perceived as rather distant, and hence where the stabilizing bene…ts from de ‡ating debt away are relatively minor. And second, by raising the value of defaulting relative that in the in ‡ationary regime.
Average performance
So far we have analyzed the equilibrium value function and policy functions, i.e. the optimal choices of …scal and monetary policy and the associated welfare at each point of the state space. The main result from the previous section is that the no-in ‡ation regime yields higher welfare at any debt ratio, including at the respective default thresholds. This does not guarantee however that unconditional average welfare would be higher too. For instance, it could be the case that the in ‡ationary regime delivered lower debt ratios most of the time, which could easily imply higher average welfare.
In order to compute unconditional averages of welfare and other variables, we thus need to solve for the stationary distribution of the state variable, the debt ratio. For this purpose, it is useful to distinguish between (a) 'normal'times in which the country meets its debt obligations and hence can access capital markets and (b) the exclusion periods that follow each default. The stationary distribution conditional on being in 'normal' times, which we may denote by f (b), satis…es the following Kolmogorov Forward Equation (KFE),
with the constraint 1 =
Appendix D shows how to compute f (b) numerically, using an upwind …nite di¤erence scheme similar to the one employed to solve for the value and bond price functions. Figure 3 displays the stationary distributions of the debt ratio for both the baseline and the no-in ‡ation regimes, conditional on being in normal times. In the baseline regime, the possibility of using in ‡ation to de ‡ate debt away allows the government to shift the debt distribution slightly to the left vis-à-vis the no-in ‡ation regime.
Conditional on being in an exclusion period, we have already seen that primary de…cit and in ‡ation are both zero, c t = t = 0. Since the rate at which the country reenters capital markets is constant at and hence independent of the time elapsed since default, we have that the value function and bond price are equal to their boundary values:
Finally, we assume for simplicity that during the exclusion period the debt ratio is equal to b , i.e. the ratio at which the country defaults. 30 We can now compute the unconditional mean of each variable as the weighted average of the conditional means, using as weights the average time spent in normal and exclusion periods. It is relatively straightforward to show that the stationary probability of being in normal times and in exclusion periods equal
, respectively. Thus, the unconditional mean of a variable x t equals
where x is the value of x t during the exclusion period.
31 Table 2 displays the unconditional averages of a number of key variables in our model for both monetary regimes, as well as their corresponding empirical counterparts across EMU periphery countries 32 . Notice …rst that, remarkably, the model with no in ‡ation replicates exactly the average bond risk premium (154 bp) conditional on being still on the bond market (b < b ); it also reproduces well the average bond yield. In the in ‡ationary regime, average yields (net of r = 400 bp) while still in the market (448 bp) re ‡ect mostly the in ‡ation premia (309 bp), rather than risk premia (139 bp). Interestingly, the fact that the no-in ‡ation regime delivers lower average yields than the in ‡ationary regime rationalizes the observed reduction in average sovereign yields across the EMU periphery brought about by the creation of the eurozone, if one interprets both regimes as the model counterparts of the EMU and pre-EMU periods respectively. Indeed, average yields on 10-year peripheral bonds decreased from 12.84% in the period 1987-94 to 5.87% in 1995-2012. Viewed through the lens of our model, this suggests that, when these countries decided to renounce the ability to de ‡ate their debts by joining EMU, the reduction in in ‡ation expectations was a more important factor in investors' pricing of the new euro-denominated bonds than the presumable increase in default risk. 30 We are thus assuming that during the exclusion/renegotiation period nominal debt outstanding is adjusted at each point in time to changes in the output endowment, such that the debt ratio is kept constant at b . We could alternatively assume that, during the exclusion period, nominal debt outstanding is kept constant at its value at the time of default (B t ), such that the debt ratio changes with the output endowment. This would complicate the analysis while barely a¤ecting the numerical results, given the relatively short average duration of the exclusion period. 31 As explained above, c = 0, = 0, V = V (b ), and Q = Q (b ). 32 All data are annual except bond yields and risk premia which are quarterly. We stop the sample for yields and risk premia in 2012:Q2 (included) in order to isolate our analysis from the e¤ects of the annoucement by the European Central Bank of the Outright MonetaryTransactions (OMT) programme in the summer of 2012. From a welfare perspective, we …nd that average welfare is higher in the no-in ‡ation regime, i.e. when the government renounces the possibility of de ‡ating debt away. For instance, under our baseline calibration ( = 9:15) the welfare gains from not using debt de ‡ation are equivalent to a 0.25% increase in consumption forever. Therefore, the leftward shift in the debt distribution shown in Figure 3 is not su¢ cient to compensate for the fact that the value function is higher at any debt ratio. In terms of costs and bene…ts, our results indicate that while reducing average in ‡ation makes sovereign debt more vulnerable (as implied by higher risk premia and lower expected timeto-default on average), this is more than compensated by the reduction in nominal yields in new bond issuances and the elimination of direct welfare costs.
Robustness
We now evaluate the robustness of our main results to alternative calibrations. We will focus on (i) the amortization rate , (ii) the bond recovery parameter , and (iii) the default cost parameter b.
The amortization rate determines the average Macaulay bond duration, 1= ( + r), for given riskless real return r. Table 3 displays averages of a number of key variables for bond durations of 3 and 6 years, both for the no-in ‡ation and the baseline in ‡ationary regimes. For comparison, it also displays the same statistics for the benchmark calibration, with a 5-year bond duration. We …nd that average welfare continues to be higher in the no-in ‡ation regime. The welfare loss from using discretionary in ‡ation decreases with bond duration. Intuitively, longer bond durations give more stability to the debt ratio, thus reducing the need to use debt de ‡ation. This allows to reduce in ‡ation premia in bond yields and direct utility costs, and hence the welfare loss relative to the no-in ‡ation case.
The bond recovery parameter, , controls the average bond recovery rate after default, = ( ), for given reentry and trend growth rates ( ; ). Table 3 displays results for average recovery rates of 50% and 70% (the benchmark calibration is 60%). Again, average welfare is higher if the government renounces the possibility to de ‡ate debt away. In this case, the welfare gains are fairly similar across di¤erent calibrations. As in the baseline calibration, the reduction in average in ‡a-tion premia from giving up debt de ‡ation clearly dominates the increase in average risk premia.
Finally,b controls the loss in (log)output following default, maxf0; b b g, for given scale parameter and equilibrium default threshold b . We consider values ofb such that, in equilibrium, output declines by 3.5% and 7% upon default (compared to the benchmark 6% loss). In this case, the welfare gains from not de ‡ating debt away, while positive, seem more sensitive to the size of output losses associated to default. The reason is the following. In our model, a positive relationship exists betweenb and average debt ratios. Therefore, lower values ofb imply lower debt on average and therefore a weaker incentive to de ‡ate the latter away. Lower average in ‡ation in turn reduces in ‡ation premia and direct utility costs, thus reducing the welfare gap with respect to the no-in ‡ation scenario. Note: Welfare is calculated with respect to the no-in ‡ation calibration and it is expressed in % of permanent consumption.
Monetary policy delegation
So far we have compared two alternative scenarios. In the baseline in ‡ationary regime, a benevolent government maximizes social welfare taking into account households'preferences towards in ‡ation, where such preferences are calibrated to match the observed in ‡ation performance in the EMU peripheral economies in the pre-EMU period. In the 'no in ‡ation'regime, the government, aware of its inability to make in ‡ation commitments, e¤ectively renounces its ability to de ‡ate debt away. Under our baseline calibration for the relative weight on in ‡ation disutility in households' preferences, , we have found that giving up such discretionary stabilization tool actually increases welfare. As explained in section 2.3.3, such a scenario can be interpreted as the government issuing foreign currency debt, or joining a monetary union with a very strong anti-in ‡ationary stance. We also argued that one could view the 'no in ‡ation'regime as a situation in which the government appoints an independent central banker with an extremely great distaste for in ‡ation.
In this section, we consider an intermediate arrangement by which the government delegates (discretionary) monetary policy to an independent central banker whose distaste for in ‡ation is greater than that of society, but not so extreme as to imply zero in ‡ation at all times. The question here is whether one can …nd intermediate preferences towards in ‡ation that achieve better welfare outcomes than the two regimes considered thus far.
Formally, our maximization problem is modi…ed as follows. On the one hand, the benevolent government retains the primary de…cit and default decisions, taking as given the in ‡ation policy function of the independent monetary authority, which we denote by~ (b). With a slight abuse of notation, let V (b) denote the value function of the government when the latter no longer chooses in ‡ation. The corresponding HJB equation is
where the value matching and smooth pasting conditions are given again by equations (12) and (13), respectively. 33 The optimal primary de…cit ratio is given again by equation (15) . Investors' bond pricing schedule Q(b) is determined exactly as before.
The monetary authority chooses in ‡ation taking as given the government's primary de…cit policy, c (b), and optimal default threshold, b . LettingṼ (b) denote the monetary authority's value function, the latter satis…es the following HJB equation,
where~ captures the central banker's distaste for in ‡ation.Ṽ also satis…es a value matching condition analogous to (12) . The optimal in ‡ation decision is given by equation (16) Thus, as argued in section 2.3.3, the 'no in ‡ation'regime can be viewed as an extreme case of the independent central banker problem laid out here, in which the latter has an arbitrarily great distaste for in ‡ation.
In order to solve this problem we need to extend the numerical algorithm introduced in section 3.1. In particular, we replace the government problem (step 1) by:
Step 1a: Government problem. Given Q (n 1) ; (n 1) and b (n 1) ; we solve the HJB equation (24) in the domain [0; b (n 1) ] imposing the smooth pasting condition (13) to obtain an estimate of the government's value function V (n) and of primary de…cit c (n) .
Step 1b: Central bank problem. Given Q (n 1) ; c (n) and b (n 1) ; we solve the HJB equation (25) in the domain [0; b (n 1) ] imposing the smooth pasting condition (13) to obtain an estimate of the central bank's value functionṼ (n) and of in ‡ation (n) . Figure 4 displays the unconditional means of social welfare and other relevant variables as we vary the conservative central banker's distaste for in ‡ation,~ . 34 The main message is that average social welfare increases monotonically with the in ‡ation conservatism of the delegated monetary authority, but it only reaches average welfare under no-in ‡ation (~ = 1) asymptotically.
To understand this result, let us focus …rst on the two arguments of the household utility ‡ow, in ‡ation and the primary de…cit ratio. On the one hand, average in ‡ation decreases monotonically with the central banker's distaste for in ‡ation. As explained before, lower in ‡ation favors welfare by reducing direct welfare costs and lowering bond in ‡ation premia. On the other hand, average primary de…cit follows a hump-shaped pattern, reaching a maximum level at around~ = = 3 and then decreasing gradually towards its value in the 'no in ‡ation' regime. Intuitively, the intense reduction in average in ‡ation and hence in average yields that takes place as~ = rises above 1 allows to sustain higher primary de…cits by making them cheaper to …nance; above~ = 3, the reduction in in ‡ation and yields slows down and average de…cit rates start declining. However, the behavior of primary de…cits is mirrored by that of average time spent in default/exclusion, which also experiences a hump-shaped pattern with a peak at around~ = = 3. Thus, the downside of increasing average de…cits in the range~ = 2 (1; 3) is that the economy also becomes more prone to defaulting. The latter two e¤ects tend to o¤set each other. This leaves the reduction in the welfare costs of in ‡ation as the dominant force, thus producing a monotonic increase in average welfare.
To summarize our results in this section, we …nd that if the government is unable to make credible commitments, delegating monetary policy to an independent, relatively conservative central banker achieves better welfare outcomes by reducing expected and current in ‡ation. However, such an institutional solution continues to be dominated by a scenario in which the government fully renounces the ability to de ‡ate debt away, as would be exempli…ed e.g. by issuing foreign currency debt or joining a monetary union with a very strong and credible anti-in ‡ationary mandate.
Conclusions
Motivated by the recent debt crisis in the EMU periphery, in this paper we have analyzed the trade-o¤s between price stability and the sustainability of sovereign debt. We have done so in the context of a continuous-time, small open economy model where a benevolent government issues nominal defaultable debt to foreign investors. The government is assumed to be unable to make credible commitments regarding …scal policy (including the possibility of defaulting on sovereign debt) and monetary policy. At each point in time the government optimally chooses primary de…cit and in ‡ation, and whether to default or not. A main them of our paper is to compare this situation with an alternative scenario in which the government e¤ectively renounces the option to de ‡ate debt away, e.g. by issuing foreign currency debt or joining an anti-in ‡ationary monetary union. In our quantitative exploration, the government's in ‡ation tolerance is calibrated to replicate observed in ‡ation di¤erentials in the EMU periphery before the start of the euro.
We have found that giving up the option to de ‡ate debt away achieves higher welfare (both at any debt ratio and on average) than retaining such discretionary adjustment margin. The reason lies in the costs and bene…ts of in ‡ation. On the one hand, in ‡ation allows to reduce the real value of nominal debt and thus make it more sustainable ceteris paribus, with the resulting reduction in risk premia. On the other hand, (expected) in ‡ation raises the in ‡ation premium that the government must o¤er in new bond issuances, and also creates direct welfare costs. In equilibrium, the in ‡ationary costs stemming from higher in ‡ation premia and direct welfare costs outweigh the bene…ts from reducing risk premia. Our results thus qualify the conventional wisdom that national governments should bene…t from retaining the possibility of de ‡ating away their sovereign debt, in the sense that such a bene…t may not materialize if such governments are unable to make credible commitments about its future monetary policy. This quali…cation may be particularly relevant for most EMU peripheral economies, in view of their in ‡ation record (relative e.g. to that of Germany) in the decades prior to joining the euro.
Looking ahead, we note that we have analyzed the problem of a single government in a small open economy setup. Given our interest in recent developments in the euro area, we believe that extending the analysis presented here to the case of a monetary union with a common monetary authority and many national …scal authorities that di¤er in their outstanding sovereign debt levels is of great importance. We leave this taks for future research.
A. Numerical algorithm
We describe the numerical algorithm used to jointly solve for the equilibrium value function, V (b), and bond price function, Q (b). The algorithm proceeds in 3 steps. We describe each step in turn.
Step 1: Solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
The HJB equation (14) is solved using an upwind …nite di¤erence scheme following Achdou et al. 
whereas the second derivative is approximated by
In an upwind scheme, the choice of forward or backward derivative depends on the sign of the drift function for the state variable, given by 
The smooth pasting boundary condition (equation 13) can be approximated by Equation (37) is again a system of I linear equations which can be written in matrix notation as:
where the matrix F n and the vectors Q n+1 and f n are de…ned by: Step 3: Value Matching
Finally, we iterate until the value matching condition (12) is satis…ed:
Taking into account (33) , condition (44) can be rewritten as
B. The riskless nominal bond
We de…ne a new instrument, a riskless nominal bond. This is a non-defaultable bond issued in the domestic currency. In this case, the nominal price of the bond for a current debt ratio b b is given bỹ 
Given the equilibrium default threshold b , we solve for the riskless bond price functionQ(b) using a …nite di¤erence scheme similar to the one used to solve for Q(b) in Step 2 of the general algorithm.
by 0:1. We solve the system (51) and obtain a solutionf . Then we renormalize as
E. Data Appendix
Data on GDP, in ‡ation and current account balance for the …ve EMU periphery countries (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), and in ‡ation for the United States, come from the IMF's World Economic Outlook database. The in ‡ation di¤erential is computed as the di¤erence between the average in ‡ation in the EMU periphery and that of the United States for the period 1987-1997. External public debt is "General Government Gross consolidated Debt held by non-residents of the Member State" and is taken from each country's national accounts. Sovereign risk premia (spreads) are the di¤erence between the average yield on 10-year bonds of EMU periphery countries and that of German bonds, taken from Bloomberg. We use the yield on the German 10-year bond (also from Bloomberg) as the empirical proxy for the model's riskless yield,r t . Bond yields for the pre-EMU period are annual and are taken from the European Commission's macroeconomic database (AMECO).
All data are annual except bond yields and risk premia which are quarterly. We stop the sample for yields and risk premia in 2012:Q2 (included) in order to isolate our analysis from the e¤ects of the annoucement by the European Central Bank of the Outright MonetaryTransactions (OMT) programme in the summer of 2012.
